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COMPAQ REDUX: IMPLICIT TAXES AND THE

QUESTION OF PRE-TAX PROFIT
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INTRODUCTION

Until recently,! more ink was probably spilled over the crossborder, dividend-stripping transactions in Compaq v. Commissione/
and IES Industries v. Commissione/ than over any other tax shelter
litigation.-l In both cases, the appellate courts reversed the trial courts'
The attention given to the son-of-boss transaction, which is at the center of
the criminal investigations of some of KPMG's former employees, has since eclipsed
that given to Compaq and IES Industries.
2 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'g
113 T.e. 214 (1999).
1 IES Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'g 1999
WL 973538 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 22, 1999).
-l E.g., Peter e. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form
and Business Purpose in Stl'/lclllring Business Transactions and in Tax Shellers, 54
SMU L. REV. 47, 54 (2001): David P. Hariton, The Compaq Case, Notice 98-5, and
Tax Shelters: The Theory is All Wrong, 94 TAX NOTES 501 (Jan. 28.2002) [hereinafter
Hariton, Compaq Case]; David P. Hariton, Tax Benefits, Tax Administration, and
Legislalive Inlent, 53 TAX LAW. 579, 609-13 (2000); David P. Hariton, Sorting Out lhe
Tangle of Economic Substance. 52 TAX LAW. 235,272-73 (1999) [hereinafter Hariton,
Sorting Our]; Mitchell Kane. Compaq and IES: Putting the Tax Back il7£o After- Tax
Income, 94 TAX NOTES 1215 (Mar. 4, 2(02); William A. Klein & Kirk J. Stark,
Compaq v. Commissioner - Where Is the Tax Arbilrage?, 94 TAX NOTES 1335 (Mar.
l
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decisions in favor of the government, thereby granting the taxpayers
the tax benefits they sought.
One reason why those cases have received and continue to receive
so much attention is because the commentators are divided into two
opposing camps. One group argues that the transactions were blatant,
abusive tax shelters that the courts should have struck down. The
other group argues that the transactions were economically profitable
arbitrage transactions that deserved respect from the courts.
The debate is so vigorous because neither side has been able to
come to grips with the other side's strongest argument. In spite of
their best efforts to show otherwise,) the defenders of the circuit
courts' opinions have not been able to demonstrate a convincing
economic justification for the transactions other than tax reduction. 6
Similarly, critics of those opinions have not been able to rebut the
claim that the transactions generate pre-tax profits.?
The debate, thus, strikes at the heart of anti-abuse jurisprudence,
which for many years has relied heavily on the concept of pre-tax
profit.~ Over the years, courts have developed a series of doctrines

11, 2002); James M. Peaslee, Creditable Foreign Taxes and the Economic Substance
Profit Test, 114 TAX NOTES 443 (Jan. 29, 2007); Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic
Substance, Corporme Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX OTES 221 (July 3,
20(0): Daniel N. Shaviro & David A. Weisbach, Cross-Border vs. Domeslic DividendStripping: An J!Iusory Distinction, 25 TAX NOTES I T'L 1435 (Apr. 1. 2002)
[hereinafter Shaviro & Weisbach, Cross-Border]; Daniel N. Shaviro & David A
Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner. 94 TAX
NOTES 511 (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Shaviro & Weisbach, Fifth Circuit]: David A.
Weisbach, The Failure of Disclosure as an Approach to Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 73,
79 (2001); Lee A. Sheppard, Should Riskless Profit Equal Economic Substance'!, 94
TAX NOTES 153 (Jan. 14, 2002); Marc D. Teitelbaum, Compaq Computer and IES
Industries - The Empire Strikes Back. 20 TAX NOTES INT'L 791 (Jan. 3. 2000): Alan
R. Weiner, Compaq.' Another View, 94 TAX NOTES 777 (Feb. 11,2002): George K.
Yin. Gelling Seriol/S About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from HislOry. 54
SMU L. REV. 209, 22]-23 (2001).
, Klein and Stark have offered the most sophisticated and thorough non-tax
justification for cross-border, dividend-stripping arbitrage. Klein & Stark. sllpra note
4 (arguing that Compaq and rES were engaging in economic arbitrage. not tax
arbi rrage).
" Shaviro & Weisbach, Cross-Border. Sl/pra note 4 (arguing that the arbitrage
that Compaq and rES were engaging in was not economic arbitrage as Klein and
Stark argue. hut tax arbitrage).

See, e.g.. HarilOn. Compaq Case, slipra note 4. at 504 (conceding that the
transaction generated a pre-tax profit): Kane. sllpra note 4. at 1217 (same): Shaviro &
Weishach, Fiflh CirclIil. supra note 4. at 5]2 (same).
, See. ('.g. KIlL'tsch Y. United States. 364 U.S. 3A] (J 9(0).

824

Virginia Tux Revie\·..,.

[Vol.

26:~2l

that supplement statutory and administrative authorities. One of
those doctrines is the economic substance doctrine.
In the conjunctive form in which it is usually stated, the economic
substance doctrine requires both that the transaction has non-tax
consequences and that the taxpayer has a non-tax motive. Although
the pre-tax profit test plays a role in both prongs of the economic
substance doctrine, it is frequently the centerpiece of the objective
prong. A financial transaction that has a guaranteed pre-tax profit
(appropriately measured) improves the taxpayer's economic situation
and so it has a positive non-tax consequence. Conversely, a financial
transaction that has a guaranteed pre-tax loss worsens the taxpayer's
economic situation. If such a transaction produces a substantial tax
benefit (and if the taxpayer entered into it with knowledge of that
Y
result), then the taxpayer must have only a tax motive. Thus, in the
context of financial arbitrage transactions, courts use the pre-tax
profit test in order to separate economic arbitrages (the tax
consequences of which are respected) from tax arbitrages (the tax
consequences of which are not respected).11l
The rationale for and the logic behind the pre-tax profit test is
that any system as complicated and extensive as the U.S. tax law will
contain numerous inconsistencies. When these inconsistencies are
aggressively exploited, they allow taxpayers to reduce their taxes with
very little consequence to the risk they bear, their cash flows, or their
economic interests. The availability of such tax shelters, according to
this line of reasoning, is outside the scope of congressional intent.
Accordingly, courts will strike down transactions that fail the pre-tax
ll
profit test.
With this history as background and precedent, the taxpayers and
the commentators who sided with them argued that the transactions in
9 Application of the economic substance doctrine is complicated by transactions
that involve either or both a substantial investment for a significant period of time
and sufficient risk so that the transaction is not guaranteed to produce a certain profit
or loss. See Hariton, Compaq Case, supra note 4. Neither condition applies in
Compaq and IES Industries. The risk was eliminated by prearrangement and the
funds were borrowed.
10 See Shaviro & Weisbach, Fifth CirCULI. supra note 4, at 512-13.
II
The Eighth Circuit in IES Industries described the standard for whether the
transaction is a sham as follows: "a transaction will be characterized as a sham if 'it is
not motivated by any economic purpose outside of tax considerations' (the business
purpose test), and if it 'is without economic substance because no real potential for
profit exists' (the economic substance test)." IES Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner.
253 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). That two-part test is often called
the economic substance doctrine.
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Compaq and IES Industries should be respected and the taxpayers'
claimed tax benefits allowed. They emphasized the point that the
parties, at the time they entered into the transactions, had a
reasonable expectation (and possibly a guarantee) of a before-tax
profit from the transactions. The Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts of
Appeal agreed. Conversely, the government and the commentators
who sided with them argued that the transactions were abusive tax
shelters. In their view, the transactions - even though they yielded
pre-tax profits - were nothing more than sales of U.S. foreign tax
11
credits to domestic companies. The trial courts agreed.
Compaq and IES Industries thus threaten to confuse tax shelter
jurisprudence (even more deeply than it already is). The transactions
appear to be tax shelters because they lack a nontax justification. At
the same time, they pass the pre-tax profit test. Accordingly, several
commentators argue that the pre-lax profit test needs to be
abandoned or modified to reach such transactions. The problem and
cause for concern is that it is not clear what test will replace the pretax profit test if that test is discarded. Some commentators favor a
standard for abusive tax shelters along the lines of "we know it when
we sec it. ,,13 Many tax practitioners and commentators might be fine
with using such a broad and indeterminate standard if the final
14
decisions are to be made by the Tax Court.
Fewer would be
prepared to grant such broad discretion to generalist courts, whether
IS
as trial courts or when reviewing the Tax Court.
Fortunately,
Congress was able to avoid pushing the courts to discard the pre-tax
profit test, at least for now, with a statutory fix that addressed the
specific transaction at issue.If) However, such a fix only eliminated the
immediate problem raised by cross-border, dividend-stripping
transactions. A similar problem might arise in the future with other
cross-border, stripping transactions. J7 Furthermore, if Compaq and

I~ The sales were profitable because the purchasers had both foreign source

incomc tbat would benefit from the credits as well as substantial capital gains.

As

such. the capital losses would not be disallowed by section] 2J 1.
I'

E.g.. Shaviro & Weisbacb. Fiflh Cirellil. slIpm note 4. at 512-13.

Charvat

offers a theorctical defense of such a "smell tes!.'· Terrence Chorvat. The Consistency
o(lnCOI/.\islt'IlCY. 2f1

Vi\.

T,\X

REV.

859 (2007).

;" Lg.. Shaviro & 'vVeisbach. Fijih CirClli1. supra note 4, at 511-12.
I'

!d. at 511.

I"

Section !,lU! re4uirL's a fifteen-day unhedged. holding period for stocks when

the holdn claims a foreig.n lax crcdil.

,- See I R.S. Not icc 9~-5. jLJ98-1 C.13 334. revoked by I.R .S. Notice 2004-19.
2()()4-1 C.B h()(,.
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I ES Industries reveal the existence of a fissure In anti-abuse
jurisprudence, Congress's statutory fix does not close it. but merely
masks it.
A deeper and more detailed resolution of the fundamental issue
in Compaq and IES Industries is therefore warranted. Such an
exercise is not only of historical significance: the issues raised by
Compaq and I ES Industries are still before the federal courts. The
federal government having lost Compaq in the Fifth Circuit and 1ES
Industries in the Eighth Circuit is pursuing similar cases in other
circuits.'" Also, the cross-border, dividend-stripping transactions in
Compaq and 1ES Industries are not the only cross-border, stripping
transactions that give rise to foreign tax credits. How to handle such
transactions is an important issue and is likely to remain so for some
time. In addition, a broader resolution of the issues raised in Compaq
and I ES Industries might tell us something about our tax system that
we have overlooked.
II. THE TRA SACTIONS

The transactions in Compaq and I ES Industries are very similar. I
will use the Compaq transaction to illustrate. The numbers are
approximate and have been rounded for ease of discussion. On
September 16, 1992, Compaq purchased and later that same day sold
10 million shares of Royal Dutch Shell.'Y The trades, which were
made using American Depository Receipts (ADRs), were executed
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).20 Compaq paid $887.5
million for the Shell ADRs and sold them for $868.4 million.
Although Compaq held the shares for only about one hour, the
transactions were timed so that Compaq would be the owner of record
for Shell's October 1992 dividend. On October 2, 1992, Shell declared
a dividend of $2.25 a share. Thus, Compaq was entitled to receive a
$22.5 million dividend from Shell (the gross dividend).
Because Shell is a Dutch company, all dividends paid by Shell to
its shareholders are Dutch source income. Under the terms of the tax
treaty between the United States and the Netherlands, the
Netherlands imposed a 15 percent withholding tax on dividends
See ILM 200620022, 2006 TNT 98-20 (May 19,2006).
The Tax Court in Compaq and the District Court in IES Industries found
evidence that the sale price of the transaction was set at the same time as the purchase
price. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 113 T.c. 214 , 219 (1999); IES
Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1999 WL 973538, *1 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 22, 1999).
20 The shares were in the form of American Depository Receipts (ADRs).
1M

IY
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received by U.S. residents from Dutch companies. Thus, Compaq
incurred $3.4 million in Dutch taxes on the $22.5 million dividend. 21
The Dutch tax was remitted by Shell before the dividend was paid to
Compaq. The payment, however, was on behalf of Compaq and
discharged its tax obligation. Accordingly, after remitting the Dutch
withholding tax, Shell paid Compaq $19.1 million (the net dividend).
As a U.S. company, Compaq is taxable in the United States on its
22
worldwide income from all sources.
Thus, Compaq reported the
$22.5 million gross dividend from Shell as gross income on its 1992
23
U.S. tax return. Because Compaq was subject to tax at the top U.S.
corporate tax rate of 34 percent,24 that income attracted $7.7 million of
25
tax. In addition, Compaq reported a short-term capital loss of $20.5
2h
million from its sale of Shell stoCk.
Because Compaq had other
capital gains that it offset with that loss, the Shell loss reduced
27
Compaq's U.S. federal income taxes by $7 million. Thus, the Shell
transaction increased Compaq's U.S. tax obligation by $0.7 million the difference between $7.7 million and $7 million.2~
Furthermore, the United States permits Compaq to receive a tax
29
credit for withholding taxes paid to the Netherlands.
Accordingly,

That tax is calculated as follows: $3.4 million = $22.5 million x 15 percent,
rounded to one decimal place.
21

The United States has a worldwide tax system. For a discussion of the
difference between worldwide and territorial taxation, see KIRT C. BUTLER,
MULTI IATIO 'AL FINANCE 196-97 (3d. ed. 2003).
22

2,

The dividend is reported as income gross of the Netherlands withholding tax.

24 I am indebted to Charlene Luke for pointing out to me that the top corporate
tax rate in 1992 was 34 percent, not 35 percent, as I implied in Knoll, Implicit Taxes,
supra note "', at 681. Although this revision changes some intermediate calculations
such as the one in the next footnote, most of the calculations, including all of the
entries in the tables, are unchanged.
25 Thirty four percent of $22.5 million is $7.7 million (rounded to one decimal
place).
2(, Compaq's capital loss ($20.5 million) is the difference between the price it
paid (including fees and expenses) for its Shell stock - $888.9 million - and the
price it received when it sold its shares - $868.4 million.
27 Compaq's $20.5 million capital loss reduced its tax liability by $7 million
($20.5 million x 34 percent).
2,' The $0.7 million increase in Compaq's tax obligation is the product of its tax
rate (34%) and the additional $2 million it reported in income. That additional $2
million is the amount by \\'hich the gross dividend ($22.5 million) exceeds the sum of
Compaq's capital Joss ($19.1 million) plus fees and expenses ($1.4 million).
2'i I.R.C. ~ 901. The maximum amount of foreign tax that the United States will
credit is 34 percent or the income received, which in this case would be $77 million.
See I.RC. ~ l)(J.:l
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Compaq claimed a U.S. foreign tax credit for the $3.4 million in
foreign withholding taxes paid to the Netherlands on its Shell
dividend.
The above transaction, however, was not costless. Compaq
incurred expenses of roughly $400,000 and paid Twenty-First
30
Securities, the promoter, a fee of $1 million.
Assembling all of the pieces of the transaction, Compaq's
proceeds from the sale of the stock and the dividend total $890.2
million. Its cost of purchasing the stock was $888.9 million. The
difference - $1.3 million - is Compaq's net after-tax profit from the
transaction.
Table 1 presents Compaq's net cash flows from its transactions in
Shell stock. The second column (labeled "Before Taxes") gives the
cash inflows and outflows ignoring Compaq's tax payments. The third
column (labeled "After Foreign Taxes") takes into account Compaq's
tax payments to the Netherlands, but ignores its payments to the
United States.
The final column (labeled "After All Taxes")
incorporates Compaq's tax payments to both the Netherlands and the
United States (including the value of the foreign tax credit).
TABLE 1. COMPAQ'S CASH FLOWS FROM ITS TRANSACTION IN
SHELL STOCK.

Proceeds from Sale
and Dividend:
Sale
Dividend
FTC
Wlh Tax
U.S. Tax
Subtotal
Cost of Purchase:
Purchase
Fees
Expenses
Subtotal
Net Profit

Before
Taxes
(in millions)
$868.4
22.5

After Foreign
Tax
(in millions)
$868.4
22.5

$890.9

$887.5

After All
Taxes
(in millions)
$868.4
22.5
3.4
(3.4 )
(0.7)
$890.2

$887.5
1.0
0.4
$889.9
$2.0

$887.5
1.0
0.4
$888.9
($1.4)

$887.5
1.0
0.4
$888.9
$1.3

-

-

-

(3.4)

-

-

30 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 2001):
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner 113 T.c. 214, 218 (1999).
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As Table 1 illustrates, Compaq earned an after-tax profit of $1.3
million from its brief transactions in Shell ADRs. That after-tax profit
arose because when Shell went from trading cum dividend to ex
dividend the price of the Shell ADRs dropped not by the gross
amount of the dividend ($22.5 million), but by only the net amount of
the dividend ($19.1 million). That suggests that the marginal holder of
Shell's ADRs - the holder who sets the market price - could not use
the foreign tax credit generated by the Dutch withholding tax. For
such an investor, the dividend was worth only $19.1 million, which is
why the stock dropped by that much when it went ex dividend.
In contrast with such holders, Compaq valued the dividend at its
full $22.5 million. That is because Compaq had foreign source income
on which it was paying U.S. tax, and so it could use the full value of
31
the foreign tax credit to reduce its tax payments.
In addition,
Compaq also had substantial capital gains (at least $20.5 million).
which it could offset with the capital losses from its Shell transactions.
Only because Compaq had substantial amounts of both foreign
income on which it was paying U.S. federal income tax and capital
gains not otherwise offset by capital losses did Compaq value the
dividend at its gross amount, instead of its net amoun1.'2 Viewed from
this perspective, Compaq paid $1.4 million in fees and expenses and
$0.7 million in federal income taxes in order to receive a foreign tax
credit worth $3.4 million. Thus, Compaq came out ahead by $1.3
million.

III.

THE LITIGATIO

The Internal Revenue Service (Service) attacked both Compaq's
and IES Industries' tax treatments of their cross-border, dividendstripping transactions on a variety of grounds. The Service disallowed
the claimed foreign tax credits, capital losses. and deductions, and it
sought to recover penalties from the taxpayers. The parties disagreed
with the Service and went to court. Compaq wcnt to thc Tax Court,
and IES Industries went to federal district court in Iowa. The district
court in IES Indusrries held the transaction to he a sham with little

'1

Compaq ,vas. in the argot of tax practice. excess limitation.

" As several colleagues who commented on prior drafts oj' this Article pointed
oul. Compaq also knew of the arhitrage possihility (through Twenty First Securities)
and decided to Jlursue that opportunity. There might have heen other similarly
situated taxpayers who either were ignorant of the l1pp0rlunitv or if kJ1()\\lcdgeahlc
wcrL' ullwillin,£ III L'llgagc in the transactiolls.
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analysis of either the transactions or the law.'.1 The Tax Court in
Compaq also disallowed the transactions, but on the grounds that they
lacked economic substance.'.J
In applying the pre-tax profit
requirement of existing anti-abuse law, the Tax Court applied that test
after deducting the Dutch withholding taxes paid by Compaq, but
before deducting Compaq's U.S. taxes and adding back its foreign tax
credits..1' That is to say, Compaq's acquisition cost before taking into
account U.S. taxes - $888.9 million - exceeded its revenue before
taking into account U.S. taxes - $887.5 million.}o Thus, as illustrated
in Table 1, column 3, Compaq had a loss after Dutch taxes, but before
U.S. taxes, of $1.4 million. Accordingly, the Tax Court disallowed the
foreign tax credit because Compaq was certain to have a pre-tax loss
from the transactions.
On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit in I ES Industries and then
the Fifth Circuit in Compaq reversed the trial courts' decisions and
held for the taxpayers. The main grounds on which the circuit courts
based their decisions were the same in both cases. The Fifth and
Eighth Circuits both rejected the Service's contention that pre-tax
profit should be determined after the payment of the Dutch
withholding tax, but before the payment of U.S. taxes and the receipt
of foreign tax credits. Instead, both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
reasoned that foreign and domestic taxes should be treated alike.}7
Accordingly, in computing pre-tax profit, the courts ignored both sets
of taxes..1K Thus, looking at the cash receipts and disbursements from
Compaq's transactions (and ignoring taxes), Compaq paid out $888.9
40
million.1<j and received in exchange $890.9 million. Thus, Compaq's
net cash flow from the transactions before taxes was a profit of $2
million. In terms of Table 1, the circuit courts held that the lower
courts erred in assessing pre-tax profit using the second column rather

:n

IES Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1999 WL 973538 ( .0. Iowa Sept. 22.
1999); see (({so Shaviro & Wcisbach, Fifth Circuil, supra note 4, at 514.
::'4

Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner 113 T.e. 214, 222-25 (1999).
" Id. at 223 .
.'(, Compaq's before-tax revenue of $890.9 million is reduced by its $3.4 million
withholding tax payment.
.'7 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 784-87 (5th Cir.
2001): IES Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.3d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 2001).
,~ Compaq, 277 F.3d at 784-87; IES Industries, 253 F.3d at 354.
W Compaq paid $887.5 million for the Shell stock, $1 million to the promoter,
and $400.000 in expenses. Thus, Compaq's total expenses are $888.9 million.
lfl
Compaq received $868.4 million for the sale of Shell stock and $22.5 million of
dividends. Thus, Compaq's total receipts are $890.9 million.
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than the first. Looking at the first column of Table 1, the Fifth Circuit
found for Compaq because the transactions produced a guaranteed
before-tax profit for the taxpayer of $2 million. Thus, the Fifth Circuit
permitted Compaq to use its foreign tax credits from the Shell
41
transactions to offset its U.S. tax payments. The Eighth Circuit held
similarly. 42
IV. THE LITERATURE

The circuit courts' opinions in Compaq and IES Industries
unleashed a storm of commentary, much of it highly critical. Daniel
Shaviro and David Weisbach describe the appellate courts' opinions
as "appalling," "confused," "embarrassing," and "misguided" and the
judges who authored them as lacking any "glimmer of
43
comprehension" of both the pre-tax profit test and tax shelters.
David Hariton asserts that the test the appellate courts applied in
Compaq and IES Industries were "all wrong. ,,44 Lee Sheppard
declares that the Compaq opinion "is just plain wrong.,·4:i Mitchell
Kane, although more restrained in his language, also believes Compaq
46
and IES Industries were wrongly decided. In the views of all of these
authors, the underlying cross-border, dividend-stripping transactions
were abusive tax shelters that the courts should have struck down.
William Klein and Kirk Stark are less certain. Although they
express some reservations, they argue that Compaq's and IES
Industries' cross-border, dividend-stripping transactions were
legitimate business transactions - a form of economic arbitrage 47
and the tax benefits deserved to be respected. A somewhat similar
view is expressed by Alan Weiner. In a letter in Tax Notes in response
to Hariton's article, Weiner argues that the purpose behind Compaq's
transactions was to benefit from a pricing inefficiency in the market
4x
for Shell ADRs. Indeed, my guess is that Weiner's view - that the
transactions were business-driven, not tax-driven, because the
is the
transactions produced a guaranteed pre-tax profit
predominant one among tax practitioners.

4\

Compaq. 277 F.3d at 787.

·L?

IES Industries, 253 F.3d at 356 .

. .11
44

4'

Shaviro & Wcisbach, Fifth CirCilit. supra note 4. at 51]·-]2. 516-17.
Hariton. Compaq Case, supra note 4. at SOl .

-16

Sheppard, supra note 4, at 153.
Kane, sllpra note 4~ at 1215 .

. r;:

Klein & Stark. supra note 4. at ] 336.

4X

Weiner. slIprt/ note 4.
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Yel the claim that what is occurring IS economic. not tax
arbitrage. is not convincing. It is difficult to believe that the stock

market mispriccs such a simple and common transaction as a stock
paying a known cash dividend by 15 percent of the gross dividend.
Moreover, the stock price drop when the Shell ADRs went ex
dividend ($19.1 million) was precisely the net dividend. Such a price
drop is precisely what would be expected if the market were efficient
and the marginal holder could not get any benefit from the Dutch
withholding tax.~l)
The commentators critical of the circuit courts' opinions in
Compaq and I£S Industries also faced a challenge - the cross-border,
dividend-stripping transactions in those cases were profitable before
taxes (see Table 1, column 2) and pre-tax profit has long been the
cornerstone of anti-abuse jurisprudence.
Many of these
commentators responded by recommending that the pre-tax profit
test either be modified or abandoned and replaced with a different
test that would do a better job of reaching cross-border, dividend5o
stripping and other similar tax arbitrages.
V. THE RESOLUTION

The confusion engendered by Compaq and I£S Industries can be
traced back to a mistaken conclusion with which nearly everyone
agrees - that the cross-border, dividend-stripping transactions in
those cases generated pre-tax profits. The key to understanding the
pre-tax profit issue in Compaq and I £S Industries is drawn from an
important concept in public finance - the notion of implicit taxes.
Because the courts, the parties, and commentators all missed the role
played by implicit taxes in the Compaq and 1£5 Industries
transactions. they also applied the pre-tax profit test incorrectly.
Once implicit taxes are taken into account, it is clear that the
transaction produced a pre-tax loss. not a pre-tax profit. Thus, had
the appellate courts correctly applied the pre-tax profit test, by
assessing profit before all taxes, they would have held for the
government.

The government argued that the transactions in Compaq and IES Industries
were pre-arranged so that is why the price drop exactly equaled the net dividend.
According to the government, because of market Ouctuations, the actual prices for
trades among unrelated parties were slightly different.
:iii See. e.g.. Shaviro & Weisbach, Fifth Circuit. supra note 4, at 515-16; Hariton,
Compaq Case. supra note 4, at 503-05; Kane. supra notc 4. at 1216.
4'1
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A. Implicit Taxes and Clientele Effects
Start with a simple example. Consider a taxpayer who holds a
(riskless) zero-coupon corporate bond that she purchases for $1000
51
and that pays $1100 at maturity in exactly one year. The interest on
such a bond is included by the taxpayer in her income. Thus, if a
taxpayer purchases for $1000 a corporate bond that pays $1100 at
maturity, the taxpayer includes $100 interest in her income. If she is
taxed at 40 percent, she pays $40 in tax and is left with $1060 after tax.
Such a taxpayer earns 10 percent interest before tax and 6 percent
interest after tax on her investment. Alternatively, if the taxpayer
purchases a municipal bond, she does not have to include the interest
she receives in income. If such a bond has the same terms (and is also
risk free), the taxpayer receives $1100, pays no tax and so ends up
with $1100, which is $40 more than she has with the corporate bond.
Expressed differently, she receives 10 percent both before tax and
after tax with the municipal bond compared to 10 percent before tax
and 6 percent after tax with the corporate bond. Thus, if both
investments are available to the taxpayer, the taxpayer will prefer the
municipal bond to the corporate bond.
Of course, other taxpayers with marginal tax rates above zero will
also prefer the municipal bond to the corporate bond. As long as the
terms were the same, no taxpayers (with positive tax rates) will want
to hold corporate bonds. All will prefer to hold municipal bonds.
Thus, we can expect competition among investors and issuers to drive
down the interest rate on municipal bonds and drive up the interest
rate on corporate bonds. To keep things simple, assume that there is
an elastic supply of corporate bonds that pay 10 percent interest (so a
decline in demand will not increase their interest rate) and a small and
not as elastic supply of municipal bonds. Taxpayers will therefore bid
down the interest rate on municipal bonds to 6 percent. At this point,
taxpayers in the 40 percent bracket will be indifferent between the
two bonds."2
Economists use the phrase "implicit tax" to refer to the reduction
in the return from holding a tax favored investment. There are three
alternative ways to quantify the implicit tax on the municipal bond.

,I

To simplify the discussion. assume thaI all honds are issued on January 1.
mature on Decemher 31. and pay no interest in the interim. Also assume that all
parties arc cakndar year taxpayers.
': That is to say. for a taxpaver in the 40 percent hracket. the return on the
municipal hondo 6 percent. equals Ihe rlfler-tax return on the corporate bond. 6
percell I (== 10'1., x (I -- 40%))
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First, the impiicit tax can be described as the increase in the issue
price of the municipal bond, assuming that the municipal bond and
the otherwise identical corporate bond pay the same $1100 at
maturity. Such a municipal bond will cost $1037.74.:i3 Viewed in this
manner, the implicit tax is $37.74. Second, the implicit tax can be
described as the decrease in the payment on the municipal bond at
maturity assuming that the municipal bond and the otherwise identical
corporate bond cost the same $1000 at issuance. Such a municipal
bond will pay $1060 at maturity.54 Viewed in this manner, the implicit
55
tax is $40. Third, the implicit tax can be described as a reduction in
the interest rate paid by the municipal bond. Viewed in this way, the
implicit tax is a 4 percent reduction in the interest rate, from 10
56
percent down to 6 percent.
All three methods are alternative, but
equivalent, methods of describing the same phenomenon.
Closely related to the concept of implicit tax is the notion of an
implicit tax rate. The implicit tax rate is the amount of implicit tax
expressed as a percentage of the total before-tax return. That is the
most common method of talking about implicit taxes because that
method can be readily used to assist investors in directing their
investments among alternative investments.
In this example, a
taxpayer in the 40 percent bracket pays explicit tax of 40 percent on
her interest from holding the corporate bond. Taxpayers taxable at
different rates will pay explicit taxes at different amounts and rates.
Thus, a taxpayer taxable at 30 percent will pay explicit tax at 30
percent and a taxpayer taxable at 50 percent will pay 50 percent.
However, all taxpayers who hold the municipal bond pay implicit tax
at the same rate - 40 percent. That is because all holders receive a 6
percent after-tax return on municipal bonds instead of a 10 percent

The issue price of a one-year differentially taxed bond, P, is given by the
equation: P = M (1 - t) / (1 + r - t), where M is the payment at maturity, r is the aftertax interest rate of the marginal taxpayer (that is to say, the taxpayer who sets the
market price of the differentially taxed bond), and t is the effective tax rate paid by
the marginal taxpayer on such a bond. In this example, M is set at $1100 and r is 6
percent. For the municipal bond, t is O. Accordingly, the issue price of the municipal
bond, P, is given by the equation, P = $1100/1.06. Thus, $1037.74 [P] = $1100/1.06. At
an issue price of $1037.74, a holder of a municipal bond earns 6 percent interest after
tax. That is to say, $1037.74 x 1.06 = $1100.
5~ That is to say, $1000 x 1.06 = $1060.
" Note that the implicit tax is 6 percent higher if measured at maturity rather
than issuance. Thus, the present value of the tax discounted at the 6 percent after-tax
discount rate is $37.74. That is to say, $40 = $37.74 x (1.06).
5f>
On a one-year bond bought for $1000, a 4 percent reduction in interest rate
reduces the interest payment by $40.
53
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before-tax return on corporate bonds. Because every investor could
purchase corporate bonds paying 10 percent, every holder of
municipal bonds pays implicit tax at a rate of 40 percent. That forty
percent implicit tax rate is calculated as follows:
40 percent = (10 percent - 6 percent) / 10 percent,
where the numerator is the difference in return between the tax-free
municipal bond and the equivalent taxable corporate bond and the
denominator is the return on the taxable corporate bond. The
denominator is the return on the corporate bond, 10 percent, because
the corporate bond represents the benchmark asset - the asset that is
taxed in accordance with the dictates of the tax system and that is
57
available to receive excess investment funds.
In this simple example, each taxpayer decides whether to hold
municipal bonds or corporate bonds by trading off implicit and
explicit taxes. A taxpayer should choose the bond for which her total
tax rate is the lowest. Thus, a taxpayer in the 20 percent tax bracket
prefers to hold the corporate bond rather than the municipal bond.
She is better off paying 20 percent explicit tax rather than 40 percent
implicit tax. The situation is reversed for a taxpayer in the fifty
percent bracket. She is better off paying implicit tax at 40 percent
rather than explicit tax at 50 percent.
The basic principles carryover, but the arithmetic is messier,
when the tax favored investment is not exempt from tax, but is instead
taxed at a reduced rate. For example, assume that there is another
class of bonds where the taxpayer is required to include only half of
her income from the bond. From the perspective of a 40 percent
taxpayer, she is taxed at 20 percent on the coupon from such a bond.
If 40 percent taxpayers competed to acquire such bonds, they will bid
58
Alternatively, if such bonds each cost
up their price to $] 023.26.

57
MYRai\' SCHOLES ET AL.. TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING
ApPROACH 125-27 (3d ed. 2005). Note further that the 10 percent interest rate does
not come from observing the municipal bond, but from the before-tax return on
corporate bonds (the benchmark asset in the market in which the municipal bond

trades).
" For the lightly taxed hondo t is 20 percent (that is to say. a taxpayer with a
statutory tax rate of 40 percent would pay tax at an effective rate of 20 percent on d
bond where only half of the income is subject to tax and the other half can he
excluded.). Accordinglv. the issue price of the lightly taxed bond. P. is given lw the
eyudtion. $1023.26 [P] = $] ]00 (1 - .2) / (1 + .06 + .2). At such a price. the bond
prodllce~ S7h.75 in inkrest. That interest i~ taxed at 20 percent. which generates a tax
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$1000, they will pay $1075 at maturity. Thus, such lightly taxed bonds
generate a before-tax return of 7.5 percent.
As above. we can describe the implicit tax on the lightly taxed
asset in three different. hut equivalent, ways. The implicit tax is an
increase in the purchase price of $23.26, a reduction in the payment at
maturity of $25. or a reduction in the interest rate of 2.5 percent from 10 percent to 7.5 percent. Expressed in terms of a tax rate, the
implicit tax rate on the bond is 25 percent.5~
Consider now what happens if there is still another class of bonds
that is taxed more heavily than the benchmark asset. Assume, for
example, that the holders of such bonds are taxed on double their
income. Thus, if such a bond costs $1000 and pays $1100 at maturity,
the taxpayer includes $200 in income. For a taxpayer in the 40
percent bracket, she pays $80 in tax and is left with $1020. That is $40
less than what she has with the same investment in a corporate bond.
The 40 percent taxpayer will avoid such a bond, as will all taxpayers
with positive tax rates, and so its price will drop. Assuming that
investors in the 40 percent tax bracket set the price for such bonds,
then the price of the heavily taxed bond will drop to $846.15 in order
6lJ
to provide the same after-tax return as a corporate bond.
At this
price, the heavily taxed bond pays a stated rate of return of 30

liability of $15.35. Thus. the taxpayer is left with $1084.65 after paying taxes. That is
an after-tax return of 6 percent on the purchase price of $1023.26. That is to say,
$1023.26 x 1.06 = $1084.65.
") For a taxpayer in the forty percent bracket, the explicit tax rate on the lightly
taxed bond is 15 percent, not 20 percent. The explicit tax rate is 15 percent because
the tax payment is $15 (= 20% of $75 interest payment) and the total interest payment
before explicit and implicit taxes is $100. not $75. See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 57,
at 125-27. Thus. for taxpayers in the 40 percent bracket, the total tax rates on lightly
taxed and corporate bonds are both 40 percent, and hence they are indifferent
between them. Taxpayers with marginal tax rates above 40 percent will have a higher
total tax on the benchmark asset than on the lightly taxed bond and so will form the
clientele for the lightly taxed bond. Conversely, taxpayers with marginal tax rates
below 40 percent will have a lower total tax rate on the benchmark than on the lightly
taxed bond and so will avoid the lightly taxed bond.
For the heavily taxed bond. t is 80 percent (that is to say, a taxpayer with a
statutory tax rate of 40 percent would pay tax at an effective rate of 80 percent on a
bond where double the income is subject to tax). Accordingly, the issue price of the
heavily taxed bond, P, is given by the equation, $846.15 [P] = $1100 (1 - 0.8) I (1 + .06
+ 0.8). At such a price, the bond produces $253.85 in interest. That interest is taxed
at 80 percent, which generates a tax liability of $203.08. Thus, the taxpayer is left with
$896.92 after paying taxes. That is an after-tax return of 6 percent on the purchase
price of $846.15. That is to say. $846.15 x 1.06 = $896.92.
no
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. percent. We can call the increased return or reduced price on the
bond an implicit subsidy or a negative implicit tax. It arises from the
extra heavy explicit tax on the bond.
Once again, we can describe the implicit tax on the highly taxed
asset in three different, but equivalent, ways. The negative implicit
tax is a decrease in the purchase price of $153.85, an increase in the
payment at maturity of $200, or a 200 percent increase in the interest
rate - from 10 percent to 30 percent. Expressed in terms of a tax
62
rate, the implicit tax rate on the bond is negative 200 percent.
Returning to Compaq and IES Industries, the connection between
the above example and those cases is made by asking the question,
what is the cost of each of the differentially taxed bonds before taxes?
Assume that the bonds all pay $1100 at maturity. The obvious answer
is the issue price of each bond - $1037.74 for the untaxed bond,
$1023.26 for the lightly taxed bond, and $846.15 for the heavily taxed
bond. That answer, however, is wrong. Those prices are before
explicit taxes, but they are after implicit taxes. As given in Table 2, the
cost of each bond before all taxes, both explicit and implicit (and
including negative implicit taxes), is $1000.
In each case, the
difference between the issue price and $1000 is an implicit tax. That
implicit tax is positive for the untaxed ($37.74) and lightly taxed
($23.26) bonds and negative (-$153.15) for the heavily taxed bond.

"I

That is to say. $846.]5 x 1.3 = $1100.

", For a taxpayer in the 40 perceI1l tax bracket, the explicit tax rate on the bond
is 240 percent. not 80 percent. The explicit tax rate is 240 percent because the tax
paymcnt (assuming a 1000 issue price) is $240 (= 80% of $300 interest payment) and
tIll: total interest payment hefore explicit and implicit taxes is $100. not $300. See
SCHOU-,S ET At.. .II/pm note 57. Thus, for such taxpayers, the total tax rates on heavily
ta<;cJ and corporate bonds arc both 40 percent. and hence they are indifferent
between them. Taxpayers with marg.inal tax rates helow 40 percent will have a higher
totalta<; on the benchmark asset than on the heavily taxed hondo cllld so will form the
clientele for the heavilv ta<;cd hondo Conversely, taxpayers with marginal tax raks
ahuvc ---l-O pcrcent will havc a lower total tax rate on the benchmark than on the
hL'(\vil\ !;l<;cd hond ,tnd ,,0 ,viII (\void the heavil\' taxed bond.
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TABLE 2. BEFORE-TAX PRICE OF DIFFERF.. Tf.ALLY TAXED BONDS.'"

Bond Tax
Rate
Single
Untaxed

Issue
Price
$1000.00
$1037.74

Implicit
Tax
Kone
$ 37.74

Before-Tax
Price
$1000.00
$1000.00

Bond
Benchmark
Untaxed
Lightly
Half
$1023.26 $ 23.26
$1000.00
Taxed
Heavily
Double
$ 846.15 ($153.15)
$1000.00
Taxed
*Table assumes all bonds are issued so that they pay $1100 in
one year at maturity; bond tax rate is expressed as a multiple of
the taxpayer's tax rate; issue price is the price at which bond
sells for in the market; and prices are set by taxpayers in the 40
percent bracket.
B.

Application to Compaq and IES Industries

Essentially, the same question is at the heart of Compaq and IES
Industries. And it is the same sort of oversight, equating the cash
purchase price with the before-tax cost, that is the source of the
appellate courts' mistaken conclusions that the transactions in
Compaq and I ES /ndustries were profitable before taxes.
The appellate court in Compaq sought to determine whether
Compaq had a before-tax profit on its transactions in Shell stock.
That, in turn, depends on the pre-tax cost to Compaq of its Shell
stock. Ignoring implicit taxes, the court took Compaq's out-of-pocket
purchase price - $887.5 million - and added fees and expenses $1.4 million - to arrive at Compaq's pre-tax cost of acquiring the
shares - $888.9 million.
Compaq's pre-tax revenue from the
transactions is the sum of Compaq's sale price for its Shell shares
($868.4 million) and gross dividend ($22.5 million), which totals $890.9
million.
Thus, because Compaq's pre-tax revenue from the
transactions ($890.9 million) exceeded its pre-tax cost ($888.9 million)
by $2 million, the transactions produced a pre-tax profit. The Fifth
Circuit, therefore, held that Compaq's Shell transactions had
economic substance and so it reversed the trial court, thereby allowing
Compaq to take the tax benefits that it sought.
One of the points emphasized by Myron Scholes, Mark Wolfson,
and their co-authors in their tax planning textbook, Taxes and
Business Strategy, is that implicit taxes are real taxes, just as are
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explicit taxes. Although the significance of implicit taxes is evident
when a taxpayer is choosing between taxable and tax-exempt bonds,64
implicit taxes are often overlooked by courts and commentators when
65
Taking implicit taxes into account and
applying legal principles.
recognizing that there can be (positive) implicit taxes as well as
negative implicit taxes (implicit subsidies) leads to the conclusion that
the transactions in Compaq and IES Industries do not generate pretax profits, but instead produce pre-tax losses.
Viewed from this perspective, Compaq did not pay $887.5 million
before tax ($888.9 million after expenses) for its shares of Shell. Such
a payment is not before all taxes because it is after the negative
implicit tax (implicit subsidy) paid by Compaq that is a direct result of
the withholding tax. The withholding tax suppressed the cum dividend
price of Compaq's Shell stock by $3.4 million - the amount that Shell
subsequently withheld and paid over to the Dutch taxing authorities
on Compaq's behalf. Thus, the amount paid by Compaq before all
taxes (including implicit and explicit taxes, whether positive or
66
negative) for its Shell stock was $890.9 million.
Thus, Compaq's
before-tax cost, including expenses ($1.4 million), was $892.3 million.
That exceeded its before-tax proceeds of $890.9 million by $1.5
million. Thus, when proper account is taken of implicit taxes, the
67
transactions produced a pre-tax loss, not a pre-tax gain. See Table 3
below:

fl:;

SCHC)LES ET .A.L., slI/Jra note 57~ at

2.

h~ See SCH()LES ET AL .. supra note 57, at 121.
(,:i

Crane has forcefully argued that courts and commentators need 10 thin k long
and hard about incorporelting implicit taxes into legal doctrines. Charlotte Crane.
Sume Explicil Thinking AboUI fmplicil Taxes. 52 SMU L. Rev. 339 (1999)
hr. Thelt is to say. the before-tax cost of Compaq's Shell shelrcs was the $iNO.9
million cum dividend price excluding the $3.4 million of negative implicit tax that
drove thelt stock's market price down to $886.5 million.

,,' Although taking account of implicit taxes reduced the pre-tax profit fmm the
transelction. it docs not change the after-tax profit. 11 was still $1.3 million.
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TABLE 3. COMPAQ'S BEFORE-TAX CASH FLOWS FROM ITS
TRANSACTiON lN SHELL STOCK.
I

Proceeds from Sale
and Dividend:
Sale
Dividend
FTC
W/h Tax
US Tax
Subtotal
Cost of Purchase:
Purchase
Fees
Expenses
Implicit Subsidy
Subtotal
Net Profit

C.

Before All Taxes
(Both Explicit
and Implicit)
(in millions)
$868.4
22.5
-

-

$890.9

$890.9
1.0
0.4
-

$892.3
($1.4)

I

After All Taxes
(Both Explici t
and Implicit)
(in millions)
$868.4
22.5
3.4
(3.4)
(0.7)
$890.2

$890.9
1.0
0.4
(3.4)
$888.9
$1.3

The Nature of the Arbitrage in Compaq and rES Industries

In order to see clearly the tax arbitrage in Compaq and 1ES
Industries, recall that Compaq's $22.5 million Shell dividend was
subject to $3.4 million Dutch withholding tax. That tax, which Shell
remitted on behalf of Compaq, was the only tax Compaq owed to the
Netherlands as a result of its transactions in Shell stock. Specifically,
in calculating its Dutch taxes, Compaq could not deduct its $20.5
6s
million capital loss on its Shell share.
Although the Dutch withholding tax looks like an income tax, it is
not a tax on income as economists ordinarily understand the term.
Instead, it is a tax on a specific payment, a dividend, regardless of the
taxpayer's income. The tax applies to all foreign holders, whether forfiLl
profit or non-profit, and without regard to the taxpayer's income.

6X Recall that Compaq purchased the shares for $888.9 million (including fees
and expenses, but excluding the negative implicit tax) and sold them for $868.4
million.
69 In the extreme, had the Shell stock become worthless by the time of the sale.
Compaq would have still paid the withholding tax (assuming it received the dividend).
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That is to say, Compaq did not receive any Dutch tax benefits from its
capital loss on its Shell shares. Furthermore, Compaq's liability for
the tax was independent of the length of time it held the stock (as
Compaq was counting upon). Instead, it was a direct result of owning
the stock at a point in time - the moment of record for the payment
70
of the dividend. Thus, when the Shell stock went from trading cum
dividend to ex dividend, it also went from trading cum withholding tax
liability to trading ex withholding tax liability.
For holders of Shell stock who could use the full foreign tax credit
and had no problem with the embedded capital loss (because they had
capital gains that the losses could offset), the Dutch withholding tax
was not detrimental. For such taxpayers, the Dutch withholding tax
was offset by a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the tax paid to the U.S.
government. Accordingly, such taxpayers valued the dividend at its
gross amount. Conversely, for taxpayers who could not make any use
of the foreign tax credit, the Dutch withholding tax was a detriment to
the full extent of the tax. Accordingly, such taxpayers valued the
dividcnd at its net amount.
If the market for the Shell ADRs contained many investors who
could usc the full foreign tax credit, then the market would value the
dividend at its gross amount and the price of the stock would have
dropped when the stock went ex dividcnd by the gross dividend.
Alternatively, if the market contained few investors who could use the
foreign tax credit in whole or part. then the market would have valued
the dividend at its net amount and the price of the stock would have
dropped when it went ex dividend by the amount of the net dividend.
Moreover, such a tax would have reduced the sale price of the stock
before the stock went ex dividend by the present value of withholding
71
tax.

The logic behind taxing dividends in general and the dividend withholding tax
in particular is. in part. that dividends generally represent income earned by the payor
over a period of time. The tax. however. is imposed at a point in time for
administrative convenience. That point is when the cash is available and about to
leave the reach of the home country's tax authorities. The tax is not imposed because
the income is earned then. The justifications for the dividend withholding tax are
liquidity and administrability. rather than economic accuracy. See Klein & Stark,
wpm note 4. at ] 33\).
7{,

That is to say. if there was onlv going to be one dividend payment- perhaps
because the payor plans to switch from dividends that alT suhject to the withholding
t(L\ to redemptions thai are not. the cilm dividend price will he lower in the second
case than the firsl bv the amount of tax to be withheld on the one remaining dividend
p;I\·mcnt.
-1
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Of course, the actual market for Shell AD Rs in 1902 was
composed of both types of investors - those that received full value
for the foreign tax credit and those that received no value - and
probably a few that received only some (expected) value for the
foreign tax credit. It might, then, be thought that the market
represented an average or midpoint of those investors. Equilibrium,
however, in financial markets is determined not by the average, but by
the marginal, investor. Because most investors likely would have
received either no value or full value on the foreign tax credit, one or
the other group of investors likely determined the market price for
Shell ADRs when Compaq entered the market in 1992.
Moreover, evidence from the market suggests that the investors
who paid the Dutch withholding tax, but did not receive any benefit
from that tax set the price of Shell ADRs. That is to say, at the
margin, prices were set by investors who could not use the
72
withholding tax to offset other taxes.
When the Shell ADRs went
from trading cum dividend to ex dividend, their price dropped not by
the gross dividend, but by the net dividend. The price dropped by
only the net dividend because the withholding tax had already
depressed the cum dividend price of the ADRs by the (expected
73
present value) of the withholding tax.
It, therefore, follows that the arbitrages in Compaq and [ES
Industries are examples of clientele-based arbitrages. 74 The key to
clientele-based arbitrage is the trade-off between implicit and explicit

72 Such investors include non-profit entities outside of the Netherlands, investors
from countries that have territorial tax systems and thus do not credit foreign taxes,
and investors from countries with worldwide tax systems, but nonetheless cannot use
the foreign tax credit.
73 Several commentators have argued that what made the dividend-stripping
transactions attractive to Compaq was that the cum dividend price of the Shell stock
was already reduced by the value of the Dutch withholding tax. Klein and Stark, who
attribute that position to other, uncited commentators, reject it. Klein & Stark, supra
note 4, at 1338 n.11. In contrast, Sheppard identifies such price suppression as the
source of the tax shelter in Compaq. Sheppard, supra note 4, at 154. McDaniel et al.
in their insightful discussion of Compaq go further. They argue that Compaq's Shell
transactions were profitable after-tax and appeared profitable before-tax only
because of such price suppression. PAUL R. McDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL I COME
TAXATION 1332-34 (5th ed. 2004).
74 The nature of the tax arbitrage is identified by Klein & Stark. supra note 4. at
1336-38 (describing tax arbitrage as a result of asymmetric tax treatments across
parties). Although the authors do not use the expression "clientele-based arbitrage"
that is the import of their discussion.
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taxes. Compaq and IES Industries were implicitly paid for taking on
the obligation to explicitly pay the withholding tax on the dividend.
That obligation would have otherwise fallen on the original owners of
the stock. Those owners implicitly paid Compaq, IES Industries, and
other market purchasers for paying that tax by selling them their stock
at a discount to what the stock would have otherwise sold for without
the Dutch tax. For Compaq and IES Industries, the reduced purchase
prices they paid were negative implicit taxes, which in the case of
7
Compaq was in the amount of $3.4 million. /i For Compaq, which was
excess limitation and could use the full foreign tax credit, the explicit
tax on the transaction was substantially reduced by the credit - it was
only $0.7 million. Thus, Compaq traded the $3.4 million negative
implicit tax against a $0.7 million tax payment. After $1.4 million in
fees, Compaq came out ahead by $1.3 million from its clientele-based
arbitrage.
D. The Advantages from Measuring Pre- Tax Profit Before Implicit
Taxes

In this section, I argue that assessing pre-tax profit before implicit
taxes is consistent with the purpose behind the economic substance
doctrine. I also argue that such a test has numerous advantages over
the traditional method of assessing pre-tax profit, which ignores
implicit taxes.
The logic behind the economic substance doctrine is that it
separates transactions imbued with tax-independent considerations
77
from those shaped solely by tax avoidance.
Accordingly, a
transaction that is guaranteed to generate a profit is a business
transaction, whereas one that is certain to produce a loss is a tax
70
avoidance transaction.
Thus. the pre-tax profit test separates
economic arbitrage from tax arbitrage transactions. Treating implicit
taxes as taxes helps the pre-tax profit test to reach correct conclusions,
7S See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 57. at 134-35. That trade-off is easy to see
when an individual taxpayer borrows against her home or business and invests in
municipal bonds or a university issues tax-exempt debt and purchases corporate
bonds.
7"
Compaq satisfied its obligation to pay $3.4 million in Dutch withholding tax
when Shell withheld that sum and remitted it to the Dutch tax authorities before
writing Compaq a check for the $] 9.l million net dividend.

i;

See Salina Partnership LP v. Commissioner. 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (2000).

7.' An arbitrage is a transaction with no nct investment that is certain to produce
a profit. In a telX arbitrage. the profit comes from tax savings: in an economIc
arhitr'igL'. it come;; from the mispricing of at least one leg of thL' tnlll;;'Ktion.
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whereas the failure to treat implicit taxes as taxes can cause that test
to go astray. Moreover, the failure to take proper account of implicit
taxes invites taxpayers to undertake tax arbitrages that will pass
muster and to avoid those transactions - tax arbitrages and others that will not. That incentive to find the viable tax arbitrages is the
meta-lesson of Compaq and IES Industries. In both cases, the courts
reached the wrong results because they ignored implicit taxes. Both
courts mistakenly concluded that the transactions were economic
arbitrages because they appeared to produce pre-tax profits when
they were actually tax arbitrages because they produced pre-tax
losses. And by doing so, they invited others to take advantage of that
oversight.
Furthermore, the apparent failure to treat implicit taxes as taxes
in applying the pre-tax profit test will produce wrong conclusions not
only for cross-border, dividend-stripping transactions. It will produce
wrong results in a broad range of transactions. Consider a very simple
arbitrage transaction - borrowing and lending, where one side of the
transaction is tax exempt and the other side is taxable. Assume taxexempt debt pays 6 percent and taxable debt pays 10 percent, and
both types of debt are riskless. A tax-exempt borrower can earn the 4
percent spread by borrowing tax free and purchasing taxable debt. As
the pre-tax profit test is currently formulated and applied. that
transaction passes muster because it generates a pre-tax profit equal
to the 4 percent spread. Of course, the transaction is not a business
79
transaction, but a tax arbitrage.
On a before-tax basis, it breaks
even, but after-tax it yields 4 percent. Conversely, the opposite side of
the same transaction carried out by a taxpayer in the 50 percent
bracket would fail the pre-tax profit test. Such a taxpayer has a pretax loss equal to the 4 percent spread, but an after-tax gain of 1
percent. That is not right either. The taxpayers are really breaking
even before tax. They are trading off implicit and explicit taxes in
whatever way advantages them. A pre-tax profit test that accounts for
implicit taxes correctly identifies both sides of the arbitrage; a test that
ignores implicit taxes does not.
More generally, a pre-tax profit test that takes account of implicit
taxes will treat both sides of clientele-based tax arbitrages as tax
arbitrages. Unlike the existing pre-tax profit test, which treats one
side of such arbitrages as tax arbitrage and the other side as economic

Scholes et al. refer to such arbitrages as "clientele-based arbitrages" as
opposed to "organizational-form arbitrages." See SCHOLES ET AL., slIpm note 57, at
134-35.
7Y
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arbitrage, my proposed test will treat both sides the same. That is
because a pre-tax profit test that treats implicit taxes as taxes tends
toward treating tax arbitrages as zero-profit transactions before taking
account of fees and expenses. Thus, transactions with substantial fees
and expenses will generate pre-tax losses unless they also produce
economic benefits larger than the fees and expenses.XI>
Furthermore, a pre-tax profit test that takes account of implicit
taxes will yield the same pre-tax profit when the market values the
dividend at its gross amount, so there is no implicit tax. Some U.S.
investors, such as Compaq and JES Industries, were able to use the
Dutch withholding tax to offset a portion of their federal income tax
liability, and thus they were able to avoid the impact of the tax.
Because the United States has a worldwide tax system, the United
States provides U.S. taxpayers with a foreign tax credit to alleviate
what would otherwise be double taxation. Accordingly, taxpayers
with less than the maximum amount of foreign tax credits allowed by
x1
law and capital gains can use the foreign tax credit to offset U.S.
xl
taxes and the capital losses to offset capital gains.
Such taxpayers
will be made no worse off by the Dutch withholding tax assuming that
they paid as much for their stock as they received when they sold it
and from the (gross) dividend. If such taxpayers determined the
market price of Shell stock cum dividend in 1992, the dividend would
have been worth its gross amount (not its net amount). In that case,
the price of Compaq's Shell stock immediately before going ex
dividend would have been $890.9 million and there would be no
(negative) implicit tax. Under these circumstances, the transaction
would still have produced a $1.4 million loss before tax.x~ A beforetax profit test that treats implicit taxes as taxes views the pre-tax profit

'" The pre-tax test can run into trouble with transactions undcrtaken by thc
taxpayer without incurring substantial fees and expenses. In such circumstances, the
pre-tax profit will be close to zero. which pulS pressure on the accuracy with which
pre-tax profit is measured. See infra Part VI r. Of course. that same problem arises
with the usual formulation of the pre-tax profit test with self-enacted tax shelter
transactions that do not involve implicit taxes. However. the transactions arc more
likely to be approved when there is implicit tax on the expense side. as in Compaq
and IES Indus/rie.\".
~! Such taxpayers are said to he excess limitation because they are not using: the

maximum amount of foreign tax credits they are allowed hy section 904.
" At the time. there was no provision similar to section <)01 (k). which requires a
fifteen-day unhedged holding period to receive the foreign tax credit.
" Of course. Compaq would not have engaged in the cross-border. dividendstripping tran~<lclion since it would have h,ld an after-lax loss of <lbout .,1 million
(assumin,l'. th,li C'lmraq would he ;dhl\\L'd tn the use thL' f(lrcign tax credit).
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on this transaction and on the actual transaction in Compaq as equal
- both produce a before-tax loss equal to fees and expenses. In
contrast, the traditional way of applying the pre-tax profit test views
these transactions differently. The former is viewed as economic
arbitrage because there is a pre-tax profit; the latter is viewed as
(unprofitable) tax arbitrage because there is a pre-tax loss. However,
all that has changed is that the marginal purchaser can now use the
foreign tax credits generated by the Dutch withholding tax.
E.

How the Role of Implicit Taxes in Pre-Tax Profits Was Nlissed
If the proper way to think about pre-tax profit is before both

implicit and explicit taxes, then how did the parties, the courts, and
the commentators all miss that argument? I believe there are two
principal reasons for that oversight. First, although public finance
economists have long known about implicit taxes, the tax law has yet
to incorporate implicit taxes into tax doctrine. Public finance concepts
tend to make their way into the tax law slowly.84 And in many
instances, those concepts are incorporated into the law only in
response to specific and widespread tax planning strategies that
K5
directly target a specific failure and are widely viewed as abusive.
Although implicit taxes have not yet raised such a high level of
concern, they might be starting to as evidenced by the attention the
K6
government is paying towards cross-border, stripping transactions.
Second, the implicit tax arising in a cross-border, dividendstripping transaction is largely concealed from view. By their very
nature, implicit taxes - as their name suggests - are hidden taxes.
However, relative to other implicit taxes, the implicit taxes in Compaq
and I ES Industries were especially well concealed. The usual way of
thinking about implicit taxes is as increases in the prices of assets that
are taxed less heavily than other assets. It is far less common to speak
of negative implicit taxes, which are reductions in the prices of assets
87
that are taxed more heavily than other assets. Moreover, the excess
taxation that occurs with cross-border, dividend strips is further
obscured because it is the asymmetric treatment of the dividend
R~

The classic example is the time value of money.
One good example is the development of the original issue discount rules.
~h See I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334, revoked by I.R.S. Notice 2004-19,
2004-1 C.B. 606.
X7
Indeed, the definition of implicit tax in Scholes et a1. mentions only the usual
case of an under-taxed asset. SCHOLES ET AL. supra note 57, at 2. They mention
negative implicit taxes only in a footnote. fd. at 125 n.4.
s:'
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(taxed abroad) and the corresponding capital loss (not taxed abroad)
that is the source.
VI. THE GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENTS IN COMPAQ AND IES
INDUSTRTES AND COMMENTATORS' PROPOSALS TO MODIFY OR

ABA DON THE PRE-TAX PROFIT TEST

Commentators and the government in Compaq and JES
Industries have offered several proposals to modify or replace the pretax profit test. All of these proposals would have allowed the courts
to reach different results in Compaq and IES Industries. In this Part, I
argue that incorporating implicit taxes into the pre-tax profit test is
preferable to either modifying or eliminating the pre-tax profit test
entirely. I conclude this Part with a brief examination of the courts'
discussion of risk reduction and commentators' reactions to that
discussion.

A.

The Argument that Pre- Tax Profit Should Be Calculated After
Foreign Taxes

It is important to distinguish my argument - that the crossborder, dividend-stripping transactions did not produce a pre-tax
profit - from the argument made by the government to that same
effect in Compaq and IES.
Facially, my argument and the
government's argument are similar - both reduce the sum of the
sales price and dividends relative to the purchase price by the amount
of Dutch withholding tax ($3.4 million) - but the similarity ends
there. The two sets of arguments are based on conceptually different
foundations and in other situations will yield conflicting results.
I argued above that Compaq's before-tax cost of purchasing its
Shell ADRs should be increased by the amount of the Dutch
withholding tax. That is because the withholding tax depressed
Compaq's purchase price by the amount of the tax. Such a reduction
in the purchase price was an implicit (negative) tax. That tax should
have been excluded from a before-tax analysis of Compaq's profit.
thereby increasing its before-tax purchase price by $3.4 million. and
resulting in a before-tax loss.
In contrast. the government argued in Compaq that the proceeds
from the dividend should be reduced by the amount of the
withholding tax. The government gave two reasons for that position.
First, the government argued that the dividend ($22.5 million) should
be reduced by the Dutch withholding tax ($3.4 million) because the
tax was remitted by Shell before it paid the remainder of the dividend
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($19.1 million) to Compaq.

Second, the government argued that
foreign taxes ($3.4 million) should he treated as an expense in
assessing whether a transaction generates a pre-tax profit.
The appellate courts had little trouble rejecting the government's
first argument, which would have made the tax result turn on the
method of collection as opposed to the economic consequences of the
transactions. Under that argument, if Compaq had remitted the tax
itself. after receiving a dividend payment from Shell, the legal result
would he different. Because the before-tax dividend would then be
$22.5 million, not $19.1 million, the transaction would produce a pretax profit. Set within a body of tax doctrine that purports to tax
transactions on their substance, not their form, the government's
proposed rule would be out of place. Also, without more, the
suggestion that courts should focus on who collects the withholding
tax and transmits it to the authorities comes across as unprincipled, ad
hoc, and driven exclusively by the intended result.
The second reason offered by the government for why Compaq's
pre-tax profit should be calculated after payment of the Dutch
withholding tax - that foreign taxes should be treated differently
than domestic taxes - received little judicial attention. The appellate
courts spent little time disposing of this argument since the
government offered no precedent and presumably few, if any, reasons
in support.
Although the government did not pursue it, Shaviro and
Weisbach vigorously took up the government's argument that pre-tax
profit should be calculated after foreign taxes (but before U.S. taxes).
They argue that countries need to protect their own tax systems [rom
abusive tax shelters and treating foreign taxes as before-tax expenses
xx
is consistent with that position. They appear to have had an impact:
in 2006, the federal government expressed its intention to challenge
cross-border, dividend-stripping transactions outside the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits using the argument that pre-tax profit should be
x
calculated after foreign taxes. ') Such an approach, however, is
problematic.
The idea that we should treat all foreign taxes as an expense in
applying the pre-tax profit test has a beggar-thy-neighbor quality and

Shaviro & Weisbach, Fifth Circuit, supra note 4, at 515. Their principal
argument - that courts need to be flexible in attacking abusive tax shelters - is
taken up later.
KY
See ILM 200620022,2006 TNT 98-20 (May It). 2006).
sx
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conflicts with broad principles of tax neutrality.90 It can also produce
undesirable and unintended results. For example, if a cross-border
tax shelter generated large tax savings abroad and in the United
States, those foreign tax savings would increase the "before-tax"
profit from the transaction, and so could turn a transaction that would
9l
otherwise be classified as a tax shelter into a legitimate transaction.
Treating foreign taxes as occurring before-tax can also turn business
transactions with no evident tax motivation or benefit into tax
shelters. For example, as Shaviro and Weisbach themselves point out,
borrowing money at 7 percent that generates a U.S. tax deduction in
order to invest that money abroad at 10 percent in a country that
92
imposes tax at 35 percent would qualify as a tax shelter. Another
failing of such an approach is that it would treat identical domestic
and cross-border transactions with otherwise identical tax
consequences differently.C)3
Although the argument that foreign taxes should be treated as
expenses for the purpose of applying the pre-tax profit test is
conceptually problematic and has twice been rejected by the circuit
courts, the government continues to press it. In 2006, a Chief Counsel
Advice asserted the government's litigation position in those cases.
The government's argument is as follows:
In reaching this conclusion [that the taxpayer did not
anticipate a pre-tax profit], we note that Taxpayer resides in
the Second Circuit, which is not bound to follow the portions
of the Fifth and Eight Circuit decisions in Compaq and IES
that conclude that, for purposes of the economic substance
analysis, the pretax profit should be determined without
taking into account the cost of the expected foreign tax on the
transaction. The failure of those courts to subtract the
economic cost to the taxpayer of the foreign tax undermines
the test's purpose of determining whether the taxpayer had a

<)11

See Kane, supra note 4. at 1216.

'II
The example in the text assumes that foreign taxes are considered before-tax
when they are reduced as well as increased by a transaction. It is unclear how such a
rule would operate in practice. In particular. Shaviro and Weisbach. because the\'
advocate a flexible "know it ".. hen you see it" approach to tax shelters. would likely
not support treating such a transaction as a tax shelter. Shaviro & \Veisbach. Fifih
CirCilir. supra note 4. at 512-13.

fd. at 515. For a more detailed <ind complicated CX<i I1J pic:. see Peaslee. supra
note 4. at 449-50
", Kane'. SUjJJ'tI no\(' 4. at 1216.
<)"
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real potential for profit apart from the transaction's U.S. tax
hencfits (i.e., the foreign tax credit). In determining whether
a taxpayer had a reasonable possihility of economic profit, all
of a taxpayer's items of income and expense must be taken
into account. Economically. a foreign tax is no different from
any other expense, and therefore foreign taxes are properly
treated as a cost that reduces economic profit. If a taxpayer's
return is negative before U.S. tax consequences are taken into
account, as is the case here, it necessarily follows that the
benefit of the foreign tax credit motivated the transaction.
Ignoring foreign taxes as a cost in determining the pre-U.S.
tax return on a transaction would deprive the economic
substance test of the very measure it is designed to illuminate
- the return on the transaction prior to the claimed U.S. tax
· Y~
b ene f ItS.
Although carefully drafted and argued, the government's
statement represents a shift in the purpose behind the pre-tax profit
test (and the economic substance doctrine).
Traditionally, the
purpose behind the test (and doctrine) has been seen as separating
purely tax-motivated transactions (the tax benefits of which are not
respected) from business transactions (the tax benefits of which are
respected). Most investors treat foreign and domestic taxes the same.
They care about how much tax they pay, not to whom they pay it.
Thus, foreign and domestic taxes are treated on par. Conversely,
treating foreign and domestic taxes differently undercuts the ability of
the pre-tax profit test to separate business-motivated activity from
tax-motivated activity.
In contrast with the government's position, the argument that
courts should calculate before-tax profit before implicit taxes as well
as before explicit taxes does not depend upon formalities. The result
of the test does not depend upon who remits the tax to the Dutch
treasury or even whether the tax is imposed by foreign or domestic
Y5
law. Either way, the result is the same.
Moreover, and most
important, incorporating implicit taxes into the pre-tax profit test does
not undercut the purpose behind the pre-tax profit test (and the

'). See ILM 200620022, 2006 TNT 98-20 (May 19,2006).

'" The result does not even depend upon what effect the Dutch withholding tax
has upon the stock price. If the tax had no impact so that the stock traded cum
dividend at a price that reflected the gross dividend, then there would be no negative
implicit tax. The before-tax purchase price would still be $890.9 million before
expenses and the transaction still generates a before-tax loss of $1.4 million.
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economIC substance doctrine). In contrast, it advances the test's
purpose of separating business transactions from tax-driven
transactions.

B.

Commentators' Arguments to Modify or Replace the Pre-Tax
Profit Test

The commentators take a different tact than the one taken by the
government. Instead of trying to shoehorn the transaction into the
existing pre-tax profit test by arguing that foreign taxes should be
treated as expenses, they recommend instead that the pre-tax profit
test be either modified or abandoned.
For example, Kane proposes:
[I]n transactions involving the acquisition of assets that will
produce income subject to foreign withholding tax, the
economic substance test should be applied not merely by
comparing the pre-tax and after-tax profit on the taxpayer but
also by determining whether there is any after-tax profit from
the transaction in excess of the hit taken by the Treasury. ,,96
As applied to Compaq, the cost to the U.S. Treasury was $2.7 million
- the difference between Compaq's $3.4 million foreign tax credit
and the additional $0.7 million tax paid by Compaq on the additional
$2 million of income reported by Compaq.97 Because that amount
exactly equals the sum of Compaq's purported pre-tax profit of $1.3
million and its fees and expenses of $1.4 million, the transaction would
fail Kane's revised pre-tax profit test.9~
In effect, Kane's revised pre-tax profit test reframes the question
whether there is a pre-tax profit by looking at the taxpayer and the
government together instead of solely at the taxpayer.
If the
taxpayer's asserted pre-tax gain is less than or equal to the
government's tax cost, then there is not really a pre-tax profit from the
transaction, but actually a pre-tax loss. In cross-border, dividendstripping cases, such as Compaq and JES Industries. that test, I
believe, will give the same result as explicit incorporation of implicit
taxes into the pre-tax profit test.

')h
t),:"

Kane. supra note 4, at 1217.

The $2.7 million figure ignores any tax paid hy the promoter.
'JSKane.sltpra notc4. at 1217. C~onlpaq reported a profit 01'$2 I11illion because it
included the Dutch withholding lax in income hy reporting the gross (nol Ihe net)
dividend and deducted fees and expenses ($14 million).
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There are. however. several problems with such a revised pre-tax
profit test. First, it comes across as ad hoc. Kane offers no economic
foundation for such a tcst.'J'J Second, there are no clear limits where
the test applies. Kane proposes that the test be applied to transactions
with withholding taxes. but there is no evident reason for such a limit.
Such a limited test, however. is problematic because it threatens to
treat cross-border transactions differently than their domestic twins. lUI'
Yet there must be limits to the reach of Kane's proposed pre-tax
profit test. The test, for example, does not work or help when the
transaction in question is the trade-off from arbitraging the difference
in tax rates between taxable and tax-exempt bonds, whether they
produce foreign withholding taxes or not. Third, such a revised test
only works when the counterfactual is readily available. In many
cases, although not Compaq and I ES Industries, there would likely be
a lively debate over the proper counterfactual.
Another commentator, Hariton, goes even further. He argues
that courts should abandon the pre-tax profit test altogether.
Specifically, Hariton argues that the before-tax profit test will lead
courts to uphold tax shelters that should be struck down when the
111I
taxpayer stuffs the transaction with income-producing assets.
He
further argues that Compaq and I ES Industries demonstrate that the
before-tax profit test is the wrong test for just this reason.
Of course, Compaq and IES Industries do not reveal the failure of
a before-tax profit test to distinguish legitimate business transactions
from tax shelters. As I argue above, a proper application of the
before-tax profit test that takes account of both explicit and implicit
taxes, reveals the transactions as losers before all taxes. In addition,
courts can conceptually separate out investments that are added to a
tax shelter from the shelter itself and apply the before-tax profit test
I02
to the shelter itself.
Furthermore, there is a lacuna in Hariton's

'J'J
He provides a legal justification, by fitting the test into one of the many
versions of the economic substance test. but not an explanation for why this test
should be used.
IOU See Kane, supra
note 4, at 1216 (criticizing Shaviro and Weisbach for
suggesting that pre-tax profit should be assessed after foreign taxes because it would
treat otherwise identical cross-border and domestic transactions differently).
101
In addition, although this piece is often overlooked, the taxpayer must leave
the assets in the transaction long enough to produce sufficient income to offset any
expenses and generate a profit. The transactions in Compaq and IES Industries took
only about an hour, so there was little opportunity for any investment (even if very
large) to generate much income.
1tl2 Kane forcefully makes this argument. Kane, supra note 4. at 1215-16.
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argument that Compaq was wrongly decided because the pre-tax
profit test can be evaded by stuffing a transaction with income
producing assets. The gap in Rariton's argument is that is not what
happened in Compaq and IES Industries. In neither case did the
taxpayer make a substantial investment for an appreciable length of
time. The transactions took only about an hour and the funds were
borrowed.
In addition to the possibility of stuffing transactions with incomeproducing assets, Hariton (in his earlier work) describes a second
potential problem with the pre-tax profit test - the possibility that
lU3
not all of the risk in a transaction will be eliminated.
In such a case,
the taxpayer need not have a guaranteed profit or loss; instead, the
taxpayer might have the possibility of achieving either a loss or a
profit on a transaction. Of course, that was not the case with Compaq
104
and JES Industries because the taxpayers eliminated all of their risk.
Nonetheless, because of these two possibilities, Rariton suggests a
different test. He urges courts to replace the before-tax profit test
with a test of whether the taxpayer has altered her economic
lIl
position. ) Under Hariton's proposed test, if the taxpayer has
sufficiently altered her economic position, then she is entitled to the
transaction's tax benefits.
The approach advocated by Rariton has won some adherents.
For example, although Shaviro and Weisbach argue at length that the
courts in Compaq and IES Industries should have accepted the
government's argument that foreign taxes are an expense for the
purpose of the pre-tax profit test (and thereby concluded that the
transactions were unprofitable and hence the tax benefits should not
have been respected), that is not their principal claim. Their principal
claim is that any mechanical test for tax shelters is likely to fail to
separate legitimate business transactions from tax shelters.lOr, Thus,
like Hariton, they advocate a flexible "know it when you see it"
107
approach to tax shelters.
Similarly, Terrence Chorvat offers a
theoretical argument why any mechanical test for tax shelters will not

1<)'

Hariton, Sorring Out, supra note 4.

Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner. 113 T.e. 214, 217-18 (1999)
(descrihing how blended purchase price set to equal sales price plus net dividend):
IES Industries. Inc. Y. Commissioner, 1999 WL 973538, *at 1 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 22,
19(9) (describing how JES hought and resold the ADRs at prearranged prices).
ilL4

I'"

Harilon. SOiling Oul. supra note 4; Hariton. Compaq Case. supra note 4. al

502.
Ill"
!1'-

Sh8viro & Welshach. f'(fth CirClli{~ supra note 4.
Ill.
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work, and so he also advocates a flexible approach. e:
\Vhatever the merits to such a flexible test generally. an important
end point is the pre-tax profit test. If a taxpayer enters into a
transaction without incurring a net investment or any risk, and if that
investment produces a positive guaranteed return, then the
transaction is an example of economic arbitrage.
In Hariton's
language, the transaction changes the taxpayer's position (in a
beneficial way) by increasing the taxpayer's wealth. Consequently,
such a transaction is likely to be driven (at least in part) by business or
economic considerations and so is deserving of respect. Alternatively,
if the same transaction produces a guaranteed loss, then the
transaction is not being driven by business or economic considerations
(because it does not change the taxpayer's position in any beneficial
IOlJ
way other than taxes) and so it is not worthy of respect.

C.

The Compaq Court's Discussion of Risk

In addition to arguing that the transaction did not generate a pretax profit, the government in Compaq also argued that Compaq's
elimination of the risk from holding Shell ADRs was an independent
and sufficient basis for the court to strike down the transactions. The
Fifth Circuit rejected that argument. Instead, it concluded that it was
a smart business practice for Compaq to eliminate its risk by locking
110
in the resale price of their Shell ADRs.
Several commentators were very critical of the Fifth Circuit's
discussion of risk in Compaq, claiming that the decision turned the
111
anti-abuse jurisprudence about risk on its head. It is easy to see why
commentators were incensed by the appellate courts' treatment of
risk. Compaq's ability to lock in its resale price was an integral part of
the transactions. Because of the large sums involved (Compaq bought
nearly $900 million of Shell ADRs), even a small decline in price
112
would have cost Compaq a great deal of money.
Compaq probably

109

Charvat, supra note 13.

According to Hariton, failing the pre-tax profit or changed economic position
test is a necessary. but not sufficient, condition for a court to recharacterize a
transaction. If the taxpayer fails the test, the transaction will still be respected and the
tax benefits allowed when the tax benefits are specifically intended by the tax law.
Hariton, Compaq Case, supra note 4, at 502.
110 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778,786 (5th Cir. 2001);
see also IES Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.3d 350,355 (8th Cir. 2001).
111
E.g., Shaviro & Weisbach, Fifth Cireuil, supra note 4, at 516.
112
A fall of about 1.5 percent would have eliminated all of Compaq's after-tax
1ti9
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was not willing to take the risk of a substantial decline in the price of
its Shell stock; it likely would not have engaged in the transactions
without a hedge. Thus, the courts misread a key part of the strategy.
Yet the Fifth Circuit's discussion of risk has a certain logic to it.
To see that logic, that discussion should not be read separately from
the rest of the court's opinion. Instead, it should be read in light of
the court's holding that Compaq generated a pre-tax profit from the
transactions. That is because the taxpayer's risk reduction activities
are not an independent basis for denying it the tax benefits that it
seeks; instead, risk reduction is closely related to the issue of beforetax profit. If a transaction yields an expected before-tax loss, then the
taxpayer, by eliminating all risk, ensures that it will suffer a before-tax
loss. In that case, the taxpayer's risk reduction activities strengthen
the government's argument that the motivation for as well as the
expected (and actual) benefits from the transaction are exclusively tax
benefits. Conversely, if a transaction yields a before-tax profit, then
by eliminating risk the taxpayer ensures that it will enjoy a before-tax
profit. In these circumstances, the employment of risk reduction
techniques does not undercut the taxpayer's argument that non-tax
1l3
benefits both motivate and are the actual result of the transactions.
It is, then, easy to understand the court's reasoning. Having
concluded that the transactions were economic arbitrages, not tax
arbitrages, there is nothing suspicious about the taxpayer locking in a
pre-tax profit with a collar, even one that eliminates all risk. Such a
114
hedge in the court's view protects the taxpayer's arbitrage profits.
Thus, the problem with the court's reasoning is not so much that it
was mistaken about risk as it was mistaken about pre-tax profit.

D. Summary
The calls by commentators to reinterpret the pre-tax profit test in
light of the principles of anti-abuse law, to modify that test, or to
abandon it altogether should go unheeded. They are unnecessary and
undesirable. There is no need for such a drastic and dramatic
response, or at the very least, cross-border, dividend-stripping
transactions do not reveal such a need. All that is required to handle
cross-border. stripping transactions properly is for the before-tax
profit test to measure profit before all taxes, both explicit and implicit.
profi t.
11.;

Rccail that a money pUlnp. even a sI11all one. can he made large through

leverage and replication.
lil

C,iII/litlq.177 F.:1d al 7~h: IE)' Industries. 253 F.3d at Yi'\.

856

Virgilliu Tux RcviclV

[Vol. .20:821

Such a correction will also improve the operation of the pre-tax profit
test in other areas as well.
VII.

INCORPORATING IMPLICIT TAXES INTO THE PRE-TAX PROFlT
TEST

For readers who accept the idea that pre-tax profit should be
calculated before implicit taxes, one question remains: how difficult
would it be for courts to assess economic substance by applying the
pre-tax profit test before both explicit and implicit taxes? The answer
to that question depends on the circumstances. In cross-border.
dividend-stripping transactions involving actively traded public stock,
the implicit tax is easily measured. That is because the market
ll
performs a crisp experiment that isolates that tax. ) In addition, the
measurement problem is probably not severe with tax-shelter
transactions that are marketed by promoters. That is because most
such tax arbitrages are usually close to zero-profit transactions before
taking account of fees and expenses (and, of course, taxes). Thus,
arbitrage transactions with substantial fees and expenses will generate
pre-tax losses unless they also produce economic arbitrage benefits
larger than the fees and expenses.
Of course, if implicit taxes are going to be incorporated into the
economic substance doctrine, they cannot reasonably be limited to
cross-border, dividend-stripping transactions or even to cross-border,
stripping transactions. Undoubtedly there will be circumstances
where it will be more difficult to measure the implicit tax. For
example, the test might be difficult to administer accurately with
transactions undertaken by taxpayers without incurring substantial
fees and expenses. In such circumstances, the pre-tax profit will likely
be close to zero, which puts pressure on the accuracy with which any
implicit tax is measured. Nonetheless, it is important for courts to try.
The alternative is an inaccurate pre-tax profit test that does a poor job
of discriminating between harmful tax arbitrages and beneficial (or at
least benign) economic arbitrages. Such a test will cause taxpayers to
gravitate towards tax arbitrages that pass the test and to avoid
economic arbitrages that are penalized. The latter is undesirable, but
the former is the very reason for the economic substance doctrine and
the pre-tax profit test. And if such transactions are not foreclosed,
they will be exploited. That is what Compaq and IES Industries did.
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If the market is liquid and deep with many trades. the negative implicit tax is
the excess of the gross dividend over the stock price drop when the stock shifts from
trading cum dividend to ex dividend.
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Nonetheless, incorporating implicit taxes into the economic
substance doctrine opens the door to litigants complicating and
confusing every tax shelter case by drawing attention to the
complexity of the U.S. tax system and to the numerous ways in which
taxes affect rates of return. Thus, taxpayers will be tempted to argue
that once all of these influences are accounted for their transactions
116
will be appropriately seen as profitable before all taxes.
Similarly,
the government will be tempted to make the converse argument
(perhaps in addition to other arguments) - after accounting for all of
the myriad influences of the tax system, the transactions at issue
produce pre-tax losses. Therefore, in order to keep such arguments in
check, I suggest that the burden of persuasion rest with the party who
is arguing that implicit taxes should be incorporated into the analysis.
In cases similar to Compaq and IES Industries, the government should
easily be able to meet that burden. In other cases, no doubt, it will be
more difficult. However. such a proposal should prevent implicit
taxes [rom becoming a refuge for either the taxpayer or the
government when no one has any idea what the impact of implicit
taxes has been.

VIII. CONCLUSION
In both Compaq and IES Industries, the trial courts disallowed
the tax benefit that the taxpayers sought from their cross-border,
dividend-stripping transactions. On appeal, both the Fifth Circuit in
Compaq and the Eighth Circuit in IES Indu.stries reversed the trial
courts' disallowance of the tax benefits. The transactions and the
circuit courts' grounds for their decisions were virtually identical. In
both cases, the appellate courts concluded that the cross-border,
dividend-stripping transactions generated before-tax profits. The
commentators were split into two camps. The smaller group - the
appellate courts' defenders - believed that the transactions should be
respected because the taxpayers earned pre-tax profits. The other,
larger group conceded that the transactions generated pre-tax profits,
but nonetheless firmly believed that the transactions were abusive tax

"" I am rCl1limkd of Tilly Goldstein. who won the Irish Sweepstakes and sought
tll ut::fer the tax and reduce the impact of the progressive tax system on her winnings
through a complex investment in bonds with different maturities. When asked why
she made the investment. Tilly. a simple woman with little investment experience.
rL'spondeu thaI she was seeking to arbitrage the vield curve. The courts did not buy it
and denied her the lax henefits th,ll she sough!. Goldstein v. Commissioner. 364 F.2d
7.'-1 (::'J Cir. ]l)h())
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shelters and should not have been respected.
That left these
commentators to argue that the pre-tax profit test, which for so long
has served as the centerpiece of anti-abuse jurisprudence, should be
either modified or abandoned.
This Article shows that Compaq and IES Industries do not
require such a drastic change in anti-abuse jurisprudence. The circuit
courts reached the wrong conclusion because the parties, the courts,
and commentators all neglected implicit taxes. Implicit taxes are real
taxes, just as are explicit taxes, and they should therefore be treated as
taxes, which is to say eliminated before any analysis of pre-tax profit.
Correctly analyzed, the cross-border, dividend-stripping transactions
in Compaq and IES Industries did not produce pre-tax profits. After
excluding (negative) implicit taxes, which depressed the price of
foreign stock that traded cum dividends on U.S. exchanges, those
transactions produced pre-tax losses.
Furthermore, the issues raised in this Article arc not narrowly
limited to cross-border, dividend-stripping transactions. The decisions
in Compaq and IES Industries opened the door to a wide range of
stripping transactions.
Royalties, lease payments, and interest
1l7
coupons can also be stripped to generate foreign tax credits.
If such
issues arise in the future, the government should attack them on the
grounds that the transactions generate pre-tax losses after excluding
implicit taxes and not on the ground that foreign taxes are expenses,
which undermines the pre-tax profit test.
Finally, in 1999, Charlotte Crane observed that tax doctrine has
all but ignored implicit taxes and called for commentators, lawyers,
and judges to think seriously and carefully about how tax doctrines
11X
can be improved through incorporation of implicit taxes.
This
Article responds to that challenge by recommending in a specific and
detailed manner how implicit taxes can be incorporated into the pretax profit test of anti-abuse jurisprudence. No doubt there are other
areas where tax doctrine can be improved by explicit incorporation of
implicit taxes.
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Shaviro & Weisbach, Fifth Circuit, supra note 4, at 517.
Crane, supra note 65.

